

L

Two

A  
L E T T E R

ADDRESSED TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

[ Price One Shilling. ]

L

Tw

And

*Mea q*  
*rum*

T  
W  
O  
Is  
O  
A  
O

---

---

P

Sold

A  
L E T T E R  
ADDRESSED TO  
TWO GREAT MEN,  
ON THE  
PROSPECT of PEACE;  
And on the TERMS necessary to be insisted  
upon in the NEGOTIATION.

*Mea quidem sententiâ, paci, quæ nihil habitura sit insidia-  
rum, semper est consulendum.* De Offic. Lib. 1.

There is a Tide in the Affairs of Men,  
Which taken at the Flood, leads on to Fortune ;  
Omitted, all the Voyage of their Life  
Is bound in Shallows and in Miseries.  
On such a full Sea are we now a-float,  
And we must take the Current when it serves,  
Or lose our Ventures. SHAKESP.

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand.

Sold by A. KINCAID & J. BELL, Edinburgh.

MDCCLX.

I

Tw

M

Y

either  
while  
give  
and  
upon  
will  
that  
cere  
I  
may  
Perf  
Cou

---

A  
L E T T E R  
ADDRESSED TO  
TWO GREAT MEN.

*My LORD, and SIR,*

**Y**OU will be surpris'd at an Address made to you jointly in this Manner; but as I have not the Honour to be much acquainted with either of you, (though I esteem you both, at least while you remain connected), I hope you will forgive me for troubling you in this public Way; and the rather, as I think the Matters I shall write upon, to be of very great Importance; and as you will discover by what I am going to suggest to you, that I am a true Friend to Old *England*, and a sincere Lover of my Country.

I have long thought that our *Ministers of State* may be much assisted, in their Deliberations, by Persons who have not the honour of sitting at the Council-board. The wisest measures have often

B

been

been pointed out, in the course of parliamentary Debate; and Members of either house, perhaps those least consulted by Government, have frequently been earliest in suggesting such Plans of public Policy, as Government itself has been glad to adopt. The Extinction of factious Opposition, the Unanimity of every Party, and the Acquiescence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is proposed by his Majesty's Servants, while it hath produced infinite Advantages to the Public, hath deprived those who direct the Cabinet, of all such parliamentary Instruction, as their Predecessors in Power used to receive. You, my Lord, of late, scarcely hear any Speech in the House of Lords, but that of a Lawyer on a *Scotch* Appeal; and the hereditary Council of the Nation rarely assemble for higher Purposes than to alter *Settlements* and deliberate on Bills of *Divorce*. And you, Sir, in the other House, where so many skilful Champions used formerly to engage, and struggle for Victory, remain single in the Field of Battle; and your Speaker takes the Chair only to vote *Millions* and levy Thousands, without the least Debate or Opposition.

The Channel of parliamentary Instruction being thus stop'd, no other but that of the Press is left open, for those Heads of Advice to which it may be worth your while to attend. For this Reason it is, that I have thought of addressing you in this Manner. Who I am, it matters not. Let it suffice, that, unpenfion'd and unemployed, I can vie, in Zeal for the Public, with those who taste the Sweets of exorbitant Salaries, and unfathomed Perquisites. Whether my Knowledge be equal to my Zeal; whether my Acquaintance with the World, and Experience in Business, have enabled me to offer any Thing that may be of real Utility, must be

be de  
I am  
while  
time,  
tions,  
ken M  
tion,  
For,  
Intere  
perfec  
which  
will n  
much  
joint C  
prude  
ing w  
Addre  
Co  
Franc  
ness,  
tence  
ry Qu  
Sea a  
stroye  
witho  
protel  
bankr  
Blood  
all the  
Exige  
in all  
think  
the or  
these  
in th  
a Per  
rope.

be determined by you, and by the Public. This I am certain of, that my Intention is honest; and while I please myself, I shall endeavour, at the same time, not to offend either of you. Some Productions, in which you have, of late, been jointly taken Notice of, proceeded from a *factious* Disposition, which I am unacquainted with, and detest. For, far from wishing to disunite and separate your Interests, I am fully persuaded, that without your perfect Harmony and Union, the great Events which have happened under your Administration, will not have those permanent good Consequences so much to be wished for: And it is only from your joint Concurrence, that we can hope for any of those prudent, spirited, and national Measures, concerning which I propose to offer you a few Hints in this Address.

Considering the present distressed Condition of *France*, fallen from its alarming Power and Greatness, into the lowest State of Distress and Impotence; unfortunate in its military operations in every Quarter of the Globe; beaten all *Europe* over by Sea and Land; its Fleets sailing, only to be destroyed; its Armies marching, only to run away; without Trade; no Credit; stopping Payments, protesting Bills, and to all Intents and Purposes a bankrupt nation; their King, the Princes of the Blood, the Nobility, and the Clergy, carrying in all their Plate to be coined, for the present extreme Exigency of their Affairs; disappointed and baffled in all their Schemes on the Continent, and taught to think no more of *Invasions*, by the Destruction of the only Fleet they had left: — I say, considering all these Circumstances, which I have not exaggerated in the least, it is not unnatural to imagine, that a Period will soon be put to the Troubles of *Europe*. *France*, unable to carry on the war, must

soon be reduced to the Necessity of suing for Peace.

We have had Bloodshed enough. God forgive those who have occasioned this terrible Destruction of the human Species, and spread Misery and Devastation, for so long a Time, in almost every Corner of the Globe. The great Success with which the Arms of *Britain* have been blessed, puts it in our Power to give Peace to *Europe*: And it is to the Honour of his Majesty, and those who direct his Councils, that the Distresses of our Enemies have only enabled him to give the World a Proof of his Moderation; and to shew that his Inclination to make Peace, keeps Pace with the Inability of *France* to prolong the War.

“ As his Majesty entered into this War, not from Views of Ambition, so he does not wish to continue it from Motives of Resentment. The Desire of his Majesty’s Heart is, to see a Stop put to the Effusion of Christian Blood.”

What was declared, in the above Paragraph of his Majesty’s Speech from the Throne, to our own Parliament, at the Opening of this Session, has since that, been notified in Form to our Enemy. The Readiness of *England* and *Prussia* to enter into a Treaty, and to give Peace to Christendom, which Prince *Lewis* of *Wolfenbuttle* hath been authorised to communicate to the *French* Minister at the *Hague*, will, no doubt, open the Door for a Negotiation, in a Manner the most likely to be embraced by the Court of *Versailles*; whose Disgraces and Distresses, too great to be dissembled, and too extensive to be remedied, will dispose them to listen with Attention to every Proposal of Accommodation, made to them by an Enemy whose Sword was unsheathed only to punish Perfidy; and whose Successes, as appears from their making the first Advances towards

towards a Treaty, have not infatuated them to prefer unnecessary and ruinous Conquests, to a reasonable and solid Peace.

It is, therefore, to be hoped, and to be believed, that Peace is not at a great Distance; and upon this Supposition I shall beg Leave to offer a few Considerations to *you*, as to the Persons on whom the Fate of this Country depends; Considerations which are equally important as they are seasonable; and an Attention to which, before you enter upon any Negotiation, may, perhaps, assist you (if I may be allowed to suppose you stand in Need of any Assistance) in directing this Negotiation to such an Issue, as may be equally honourable to yourselves, and useful to the Public.

In this Situation of Affairs, one of the first Matters relative to the future Negotiation, which, no doubt, must occur to you, will be, the Choice of those Persons who are to be trusted with the great Concerns of this Nation as *Plenipotentiaries*. And, as much will depend upon this Point, I shall beg Leave to begin with giving you my Thoughts upon it, and the other Topics on which I propose to trouble you, will naturally arise from each other, without observing any other *Order*, or Connection, besides that in which they shall present themselves to a Mind intent upon its Subject.

With regard, then, to the Choice of *Plenipotentiaries*, I cannot but lament the Difficulties you have to encounter, before you will be able to find such as the Public will have Reason to thank you for.— I am not totally unknowing in the Characters and Capacities of many among the great. But when I cast my Eyes around me, I own that I am surpris'd, greatly surpris'd, but still more grieved, to find so few among us, capable of conducting the arduous Task of making a Peace. Whether this

hath

hath arisen from Neglect in the Education of our Men of Quality; or whether the Qualifications which fit them for Statesmen have been neglected, in Comparison of such as fit them for *Arthur's* or *Newmarket*; or whether it be owing to the State-policy, so systematically adopted, of late Years, of giving Places, not to the Persons who can best execute the Business—but to those who can best do a Job. Whatever be the Cause, the Fact is certain; and it is Matter of Amazement that there should be so few in this Island, who have given any Proofs that they are capable of conducting with Ability, much less with Dexterity, this important Business of a Negotiation with *France*. Men who are versed in Treaties, knowing the Interests, Pretensions, and Connections of the several Princes of *Europe*; skilled in the Principles of public Law, and capable of applying them on every particular Occasion; acquainted with the Commerce, the Colonies, the Manufactures of their own Country; Masters of all the Instances of Infraction of former Treaties, which occasioned the War we are now engaged in: In a Word, Men whose Rank and Consequence amongst ourselves, may command Respect, and procure them Authority, amongst our Enemies; and who to every other Qualification, already enumerated, can boast of an Integrity not to be corrupted, and a Steadiness in supporting the Interests of their Country, which no Difficulties can discourage, and no Temptations can shake:—Such are the Men, whom you must endeavour to employ, in the approaching Negotiation, and such, I hope, ye will be able to find; though, I own, I am puzzled to guess on whom the Choice will fall, none being, as yet, pointed out by the public Voice, nor, perhaps, fixed upon, by yourselves. Times have been, when we might have expected  
to

to feel  
ly be  
vouri  
ster,  
we h  
Conce  
not f  
which  
the fa  
which  
Perfor  
be exe  
there  
of the  
An  
lities  
tiation  
rob u  
War.  
seems  
binet,  
Field.  
which  
success  
ged as  
Politio  
more  
Sagaci  
tiaries  
God k  
we no  
very d  
Faction  
feat it  
we, in  
War,  
till it

to see *One* named to such an important Office, merely because he was a Favourite, or a Favourite's Favourite; because he was connected with this Minister, or was a relation of that great Man. But if we have too frequently trifled with our national Concerns, by trusting them in such Hands, I need not say that there are Circumstances at present which give us reasonable Ground for hoping that the same Sagacity, and Desire to serve the Public which hath found out, and employed the properest Persons to conduct the Operations of the War, will be exerted to find out the properest Persons (few as there are to be found) to conduct the Deliberations of the Treaty.

And very deplorable indeed must be the Inabilities of the Persons we shall employ, if their Negotiations for Peace be conducted so awkwardly as to rob us of the Advantages we have gained by the War. If we may judge from late Events, *France* seems as little to abound with Wisdom in the Cabinet, as it doth with Courage and Conduct in the Field. And if the Negotiations at *Utrecht*, in which almost all the Advantages of a War equally successful with the present, were given up, be urged as an Instance of the superior Dexterity of *French* Politics, it ought to be remembered that this was more owing to our own Divisions, than to *their* Sagacity, and to the inabilities of our Plenipotentiaries at *Utrecht*, though we had no great Reason, God knows, to brag of them. What, therefore, may we not expect from a Negotiation to be begun in very different Circumstances; when there exists no Faction whose Interest it may be to perplex and defeat it; and when that national Unanimity to which we, in a great Measure, owe the Success of the War, will still continue to exert its blessed Effects, till it make us happy with a safe and honourable Peace?

Peace?—However, favourable as these Circumstances are, the Choice of such Plenipotentiaries as may be likely to conduct the Negotiation, with Dignity, Dexterity, and Integrity, becomes a Consideration which the Public will expect should be weighed with the utmost Attention. And, if such Persons cannot be found amongst us, (which I hope may not be the Case) there is a very desirable Alternative still in your Power. Fix the Scene of Negotiation, where, indeed, for the Honour of our Country, I could wish to see it fixed; name no other Plenipotentiaries to conduct the Peace but those Ministers who directed the War: And a Treaty of *London*, in such Hands, will make ample Amends for our wretched Management at *Utrecht*.

But let Peace be never so well made; let Ministers plan Treaties with the greatest Sagacity, and Plenipotentiaries negotiate the Articles with the utmost Skill and Dexterity, yet we know from History and Observation, that they never can be perpetual, and, most commonly, are not lasting. Princes, too frequently, seem to own no other Rule of Action, than present Convenience; and the Law of Nations is seldom appealed to, but to sanctify Injustice, and save Appearances. Nor are the positive Compacts solemnly agreed upon between Nation and Nation, better observed. For how seldom do we see a Treaty religiously adhered to, by the Parties whose Interest it is to break it, and who think they are in such Circumstances as to be able to break it with Impunity?—If such Infidelity be too common amongst Princes in general, Experience, long Experience teaches us, that the Nation with whom we are soon to treat, excell us, at least, in this Part of Policy. For no Cords are strong enough to bind them.

*Gallie*

*Galli*  
bour  
Insta  
solem  
vious  
dious  
the E  
free t  
weak  
and c  
bours  
Justic  
the m  
tional

It  
when  
confer  
terest  
narch  
cure t  
make  
Proof  
be en  
that t  
Enga

W  
mend  
be no  
ment  
tail o  
would  
lence  
a Peo  
the p

It  
before  
stance

Circum-  
potentia-  
tiation,  
comes a  
t should  
And, if  
which I  
esireable  
Scene of  
onour of  
name no  
but those  
reaty of  
Amends

let Mi-  
city, and  
the ut-  
m Histo-  
perpetual,  
nces, too  
Action,  
Nations  
ice, and  
Compacts  
Nation,  
we see a  
ies whose  
ey are in  
k it with  
mmon a-  
ong Ex-  
whom we  
s Part of  
a to bind

*Gallie*

*Gallie Faith* is become proverbial, and the Neighbours of *France* can reproach her with innumerable Instances of a most profligate Disregard to the most solemn Treaties. And the Reason seems to be obvious, without supposing that Nation more perfidious than others. The Power, the Populoufness, the Extent, the Strength of the *French* Monarchy, free them from those apprehensions which bind the weaker Side to be faithful to its Engagements; and depending upon the Inability of their Neighbours, considered singly, to procure to themselves Justice, this, too frequently, has tempted them to the most shameful and barefaced Instances of national Breach of Faith.

It well becomes us, therefore, at this Juncture, when the Distresses of *France* will oblige them to consent to Terms of Peace, unfavourable to the Interest, and disgraceful to the Glory of their Monarch, to take every Method in our Power to secure the Observance of those Concessions they may make; and to insist upon their giving us such Proofs of their Sincerity, before any Negotiation be entered upon, as may give us some Assurance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements.

What Proof of their Sincerity, I would recommend it to you to demand, what Concessions it will be necessary to insist upon, I shall beg Leave to mention; after having first satisfied you by a Detail of some Particulars, that such Demands as I would propose cannot be looked upon as the Insolence of a Conqueror, but as the wise Foresight of a People whom dear-bought Experience hath taught the proper Way of doing itself Justice.

It may not, therefore, be unnecessary to place before your Eyes, some of the most remarkable Instances of *French* Perfidy, which have given Rise

to all the Troubles of *Europe* for above these hundred Years.

The Peace of *Westphalia* \*, while it secured the Liberties and Religion of *Germany*, also laid the Foundation of that Power which hath made *France*, ever since, the Terror of *Europe*. By this Treaty <sup>a</sup>, the Upper and the Lower *Alsace*, a Country of great Extent, and of infinite Consequence in Point of Situation, was ceded to *France*. In this country there were Ten *Imperial Cities*, whose Privileges and Liberties were in the most solemn Manner secured by the same Treaty, which expressly says, <sup>b</sup> *that they shall preserve their Freedom, and that the King of France shall not assume over them, any Thing more than the bare Right of Protection*. How was this Article observed? The ten *Imperial Cities* were soon humbled to receive the *French Yoke*, equally with the rest of *Alsace*, and remain, now, lasting Monuments what others may expect from Power unrestrained by Justice.

The Treaty † of the *Pyrenees* still enlarged the Boundaries of *France*, especially on the Side of *Flanders*; and the *Spaniards* thought themselves safe from farther Losses, by the Marriage of their Infanta to *Louis* the XIV. who, upon that Occasion, jointly with her, made a formal Renunciation of all her Rights, to succeed to any Part of the *Spanish* Possessions. And yet, with unparalleled Insolence, seven Years had scarcely elapsed before *Flanders* was again attacked, on Pretence of those very Rights which had been so lately renounced, and which, even though they had not been renounced, must have

\* 1648.

<sup>a</sup> Article 73. & seqq.

<sup>b</sup> Article 88.

Le Roi de France ne s'arrogera sur les villes de la Prefecture, que le simple Droit de Protection, qui appartenoit a la Maison d'Autriche.

† 1659.

appeared

appea  
Right  
The  
lity of  
the F  
Peace  
Decre  
Lewis  
which  
Strasb  
ed suc  
the m  
well e  
Oppre  
rope.

WH  
Treat  
that T  
just re  
it wa  
Franc  
Occas  
the T  
— bu  
ed to  
pitifu  
his G  
Thro  
Th  
fully  
and t  
Char  
are th  
know  
of Vi

appeared chimerical, unless a Sister can have a Right to succeed in Preference to her Brother.

The Peace of *Nimeguen* † restored the Tranquillity of *Europe*, which the Invasion of *Holland* by the *French* had disturbed. But scarcely was the Peace signed before it was shamefully violated. The Decrees of the Chambers of Re-union, by which *Lewis* the XIV. seized so many Territories, to which he has not the least Right; the Surprisal of *Straßburgh*, and the Blockade of *Luxemburgh*, shewed such a Wantonness of Perfidy, as no History of the most barbarous and unpolished Savages could well exceed; and justly drew upon the common Oppressor, the joint Vengeance of offended *Europe*.

Who is ignorant of the Story of the *Partition* Treaty? Solemnly ratified and agreed to preserve that Tranquillity which the Treaty of *Reswyck* had just restored to *Europe*, it was no sooner made than it was shamefully abandoned by the Court of *France*; and for such Reasons as will, upon every Occasion, justify every Injustice. The *Letter* of the Treaty, indeed, was violated, they must own; —but the *Spirit* of it was what ought to be attended to. And by such a Comment, worthier of a pitiful Sophister, than of a most Christian King, his Grandson was assisted in placing himself on the Throne of *Spain*.

The Politics of *Lewis* the XV. have been faithfully copied from those of his Great Grandfather; and the Behaviour of *France*, upon the Death of *Charles* the VI. is a fresh Proof, of how little Use are the most solemn Treaties, with a Power that knows no Ties but those of Interest.—The Treaty of *Vienna* had, but two or three Years before \*, an-

† 1679.

\* In 1738.

nexed to the Crown of *France* the Dutchy of *Lorraine*; a Cession which was purchased, and purchased cheaply, by the Guarantee of the † *Pragmatic Sanction*. By this Stipulation, *France* was under the most solemn Engagements to support the Queen of *Hungary* in the Possession of all her Father's Dominions. But how was the Engagement fulfilled? Posterity will scarcely believe such bare-faced Perfidy was possible, as our Times saw was actually avowed upon that Occasion. *Germany* was, instantly, covered with the Armies of *France*, to assist the Elector of *Bavaria*, in an Attempt to overturn the *Pragmatic Sanction* so lately guaranteed by them, and to dethrone that Princess whom they were bound by a Treaty, sworn to in the Name of the Holy Trinity, to protect and defend from all her Enemies.

I have brought down this Sketch of *French* Faith to the present Times; imperfect indeed; but, as far as it goes, strictly conformable to Historical Truth.—What Confidence, then, can *France* expect any of its Neighbours will put in her, after so many and such flagrant Instances of national Perjury, as she appears to be guilty of?—The Catalogue of her Infidelities will still be encreased; and the little Reason that our Island, in particular, has to trust Her, will still be more apparent, by reminding you of some of the many Proofs, which *Great Britain* itself can appeal to, of *French* Ingenuity in Treaty-breaking.—I shall go no higher than the Peace of *Utrecht*, because the Instances in which it hath been violated by *France*, have produced the present War; and because the Enumeration of them will lead me, naturally, to those Hints which I mean to throw out, as necessary to be at-

† Treaty of Vienna, Article 10.

tended

tende  
if neg  
of th  
every  
under  
dy su

Th  
had b  
ther,  
thoug  
quest  
in the  
cessio  
Great

By  
with  
cies,

An  
Inhab  
or mo  
Natio  
other

Le  
serve  
View  
they l  
worth  
tend  
the I  
which  
of cu  
Natio  
them  
Missy

\* N  
Treaty

tended to in our future Negotiations ; and which, if neglected, will lose to this Nation all the Fruits of those Successes, to gain which, we have strained every Nerve, and loaded ourselves with a Burden under which it is a Miracle that we have not already sunk.

The War which was closed by the Peace of *Utrecht* had been undertaken with Views confined, altogether, to the Continent of *Europe*, and carried on, though at an immense Expence, more to gain Conquests for our Allies than for ourselves. However, in the Treaty of Peace, some Advantages and Concessions were stipulated in Favour of the Crown of *Great Britain*, and its commercial Interests.

By the 12th Article<sup>a</sup>, All *Nova Scotia or Acadia*, with its ancient Limits, and with all its Dependencies, is ceded to the Crown of *Great Britain*.

And by the 15th Article, *The Subjects of France, Inhabitants of Canada, and elsewhere, shall not disturb or molest, in any Manner whatever, the Five Indian Nations which are subject to Great Britain, nor its other American Allies.*

Let us now see how these Articles have been observed. The *French* seem to have had two *Capital Views* in all their *American* Schemes, ever since they have thought Trade and Commerce an Object worthy of their Attention. The first was to extend themselves from *Canada*, Southwards, through the Lakes, along the Back of our Colonies ; by which Means they might answer a double Purpose, of cutting off our Communication with the *Indian Nations*, and of opening a Communication for themselves, between the Rivers *St Lawrence* and *Mississippi*, and thus to join, as it were, their Colo-

<sup>a</sup> Not having, in my Possession, an Original Copy of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, I have made Use of *Lamberti's* Translation.

nies of *Canada* and *Louisiana*. The other Part of their Plan, equally important, and more immediately fatal to our Interests in *North America*, was to gain a Communication with the Ocean; the only Access they now have to *Canada*, through the River *St Lawrence*, being shut up half the Year.

Full of this favourite Project of *American Empire*, soon after the Treaty of *Utrecht*, they began to enlarge their Boundaries on that Continent, in direct Violation of the solemn Concessions they had so lately made.

As long ago as 1720, they seized and fortified the most important Pass in *America*, at *Niagara*; in that very Country of the *Five Indian Nations*, from which the 15th Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht* had excluded them. The infinite Consequence of *Niagara* made them less scrupulous, no Doubt, about Treaties. For by Means of this Usurpation they, in a Manner, became Masters of the Lakes, and could, at Leisure, extend themselves to the *Ohio*, and carry their Chain of Forts and Settlements down to the *Mississippi*.

The Plan of Usurpation on the Back of our Colonies went on gradually and successfully from Year to Year; the *Indians* owned by the Peace of *Utrecht* to be our Subjects, were debauched from our Interest, and spirited up to massacre, and scalp the *English*; and in 1731, the Insolence of the *French* grew to such an Height, that they erected their Fort at *Crown-Point*, in a Country indisputably ours; whether considered as in the Centre of the *Five Nations*, or as actually within the Limits of *New-York*. And whoever casts his Eye upon the Situation of this Fort, in the Map, will see how greatly the Possession of it facilitated the Completion of the great Object of opening a Communication with the Ocean; and how much it exposed  
our

our  
Fren  
If  
Engl  
Fren  
I cou  
fairs  
awak  
eager  
but f  
and  
prefer  
tion o  
actua  
Fran  
Powe  
der,  
punish  
Le  
gard  
vince  
taken  
1749  
the H  
worth  
bound  
began  
on it  
ded t  
prehe  
beyon  
King  
Sir W  
monst  
named  
Penin  
New

our most valuable Colonies to *Indian* Massacres and *French* Invasions.

If it should be asked, What was our Ministry in *England* employed about, during such instances of *French* Perfidy?—the Answer must be, (though I wish I could draw a Veil over this Period), That our Affairs were then conducted by a Minister who was awake, indeed, to every Scheme of Corruption; eager to buy a Borough, or to bribe a Member; but slow to every Measure of national Importance and Utility. His first, his only Object, was, to preserve himself in Power; and as, in Prosecution of such interested and mercenary Views, he had actually engaged this Nation in an Alliance with *France*, in *Europe*, (to pull down the exorbitant Power of our old and natural Ally), it was no Wonder, that he heard unmoved, and suffered with Impunity, the *French* Usurpations in *North America*.

Let us next trace the *French* Infidelity with Regard to *Nova Scotia* or *Acadia*. Though that Province had been yielded to us at *Utrecht*, we had taken very few Steps to settle it effectually, till 1749, after the Peace of *Aix-la-Chapelle*. And then the *French* Court gave us a Specimen of *Chicane* worthy, indeed, of those whom no treaty ever bound, in Opposition to their Convenience. They began to speak out, and to tell us, nay to insist upon it seriously in Memorials, that the Country ceded to us under the Name of *Nova Scotia*, comprehended only the *Peninsula*, and did not extend beyond the *Isthmus*. Whereas the Charters of King *James I.* to Sir *William Alexander*; and Sir *William's* own Map as old as the Charter, demonstrate that the *ancient Limits* of the Country so named included a vast Tract of Land, besides the *Peninsula*, reaching along the Coast till 't joined *New England*; and extending up the Country till it

was

was bounded by the South Side of the River St *Laurence*. Of such Extent of Country they had formed a Plan to . . . us; hoping, no Doubt, to find the same Supineness in the *British* Administration which had overlooked their former Encroachments. With this View they desired that Commissaries might meet to settle the Limits, promising not to act in *America*, till those Commissaries should agree, or the Conferences break up. But how was this Promise observed? While the Commissaries trifled away their Time at *Paris*, the Usurpations went on in *America*; Incursions were frequently made into the Peninsula of *Acadia*, the Possession of which they did not pretend to dispute with us: Forts were built by them in several Places, and particularly a most important One to command the *Isthmus*; thus deciding by the Sword, in Time of full Peace, that Controversy which they themselves had agreed should be amicably adjusted by their Commissaries; and furnishing a lasting Warning to us, that a Treaty which leaves Points of Consequence to be determined by any after Conferences, only serves to light up another War.

While the *French* Usurpations went on so insolently in *Nova Scotia*; the Plan was carrying on with equal Perfidy on the Banks of the *Ohio*; a Country, the Inhabitants of which had been in Alliance with the *English* above an hundred Years ago; an Alliance frequently renewed; to which also we had a Claim as being a Conquest of the *Five Nations*, and from which, therefore, the *French* were excluded by the 15th Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht* above recited. But what avail Treaties when Interest comes in Competition? The Possession of the *Ohio* was absolutely necessary, that the great Plan of connecting *Canada* with *Louisiana* might succeed:

And,

And  
us,  
of A  
tlem  
forty  
derec  
havin  
Fort,  
Troo  
Poss  
Usur  
No  
felves  
its Co  
so la  
Peace  
to Fo  
than  
Memo  
Veng  
King  
infini  
under  
course  
half a  
Quar  
lavish  
which  
defenc  
keep  
TIO  
If  
your  
Relat  
respec  
Busin  
ing th

And, therefore, they began their Hostilities against us, in that Country, the very Year of the Peace of *Aix-la-Chapelle*; opposed our Plan of a New Settlement, (which had been thought of by us above forty Years before), insulted our Traders, plundered and made them Prisoners; and in 1754 having defeated *Walbington*, and destroyed *our* Fort, they built *their Fort Du Quejne*; and Troops were sent daily from *France* to secure the Possession of this, and of their new and important Usurpations.

No Doubt the *French* Ministers flattered themselves that *England*, inattentive to the Interests of its Colonies for so many Years before, and who, so lately, had submitted to a Disadvantageous Peace, would not have the Spirit to oppose Force to Force, and do itself Justice by other Weapons than the Complaints of Lord *Albemarle*, and the Memorials of Mr *Mildmay*. But the Hour of Vengeance was, at last, come; the Interests of the Kingdom were attended to by those in Power; the infinite Importance of our *American* Colonies was understood, and a Resolution taken to have Recourse to Arms. And thus *England*, which, for half a Century, had been engaged in every Body's Quarrels but its own; wasting its Millions, and lavishing its Blood, to obtain a Barrier in *Flanders*, which those for whom we conquered it could not defend, or rather did not think it worth while to keep; began the present War, a War truly *NATIONAL*.

If there be Merit in this spirited Conduct, tell your Enemies, *My Lord*, that you, and a near Relation of yours, (whose Memory always will be respected) had then the chief Direction of public Business. And you, *Sir*, will pardon me for paying this Compliment to those who began the War

*with Spirit*; while I, at the same Time, declare it as my Opinion, that your coming into Power after it was begun, has contributed to its being carried on with a Success equally glorious and important to the Nation.

But before I make the Application of the above Deduction concerning \* our *American* Complaints, (which I shall, by and by, make Use of, when I come to speak to the Terms which it will be necessary to insist upon at the approaching Treaty) it will be proper to mention another most important Instance of *French* Perfidy in *Europe*.

*Dunkirk*, by its Situation almost opposite the Mouth of the *Thames*, had done amazing Mischief to the Trade of *England*, during King *William's* and Queen *Anne's* Wars. The Demolition of *Dunkirk*, therefore, very naturally became a favourite Object of the Nation; the Parliament, in 1708, addressed her Majesty to make no Peace without this Condition †; and though after a War so successful, much more might have been obtained for *England* than really

\* For the Particulars of the *French* Encroachments in *America*, which I have only given a Sketch of, see the Memorials of our Commissioners, Dr *Mitchell's* Contest in *America*; the Doctor's and Mr *Evan's* Maps, and many other Treatises.

† March 2. 1708. The Lords having sent down an Address to the Commons for their Concurrence, relating to certain Conditions to be insisted upon, as the *sine qua non* of a Treaty with *France*, Mr Secretary *Boyle* represented, That the *British* Nation having been at a vast Expence of Blood and Treasure, for the Prosecution of this necessary War, it was but just they should reap some Benefit by the Peace: And the Town of *Dunkirk* being a Nest of Pyrates, that infested the Ocean, and did infinite Mischief to Trade, He, therefore, moved that the demolishing of its Fortifications and Harbours be insisted upon, in the ensuing Treaty of Peace, and inserted in the Address, which was unanimously approved of, and carried back to the Lords. See *Chandler's* Debates of Parliament, Vol. vii. p. 122.

was,

was,  
ninth

By  
moliſh  
to run

The  
Mon  
ter;

Fortij  
ter to

the E  
Man

this E  
ment.  
Peace

impor  
signed

By  
was t  
signin

find  
sifting

regar  
bour,

ces, a  
pacifi  
Mr V

ry, t  
were

Th  
Paris  
this I  
of H  
expo  
himse

was, this Point was carefully insisted upon, and the ninth Article of the Peace of *Utrecht* obtained.

By this Article, *The French King engages to demolish all the Fortifications of the City of Dunkirk; to ruin the Harbour; to break the Dikes and Sluices.—The Works towards the Sea to be destroyed in two Months, and those to the Land in three Months after; all this to be done at his own Expence; and the Fortifications, Harbour, Dikes, and Sluices, never after to be restored.* Could Words be devised, in all the Extent of Language, to stipulate, in a stronger Manner, the effectual and speedy Demolition of this Place? And yet all *Europe* saw with Amazement, and *England* beheld with Indignation, the Peace of *Utrecht* violated, with regard to this important Condition, almost as soon as it was signed.

By the Article above recited, we see that *Dunkirk* was to be demolished within five Months after the signing the Peace; and yet, near an Year after, I find Mr *Walpole*, in our House of Commons, insisting that the Peace had already been broken with regard to *Dunkirk*; since, instead of ruining the Harbour, the French were then actually repairing the Sluices, and working on a new Canal \*. And though the pacific Inclinations of the Ministry in 1713, when Mr *Walpole* pushed this Affair, over-ruled the Inquiry, the Facts on which it would have proceeded were certain.

The spirited Remonstrances of Lord *Stair* at *Paris*, on the Accession of *George I.* concerning this Infraction of the Peace, were the last Instances of Humiliation which *Lewis XIV.* saw himself exposed to; and, perhaps, he would have found himself obliged to do us that Justice, by Necessity,

\* Chandler's Debates, Vol. 8. p. 69.

sity, which the *Regent*, who soon after came into Power, willingly agreed to from Views of *private Interest*. Though the Peace of *Utrecht* had obliged the *Spanish* Branch of the *Bourbon* Family to renounce their Right of Succession to the Crown of *France*, the Duke of *Orleans*, who, by this Regulation, saw only an Infant's Life between him and the Throne, knew well, that though the Renunciation had been solemnly sworn to, the Doctrine of its Invalidity, of its being an Act, void, *ab initio*, had been publicly avowed. *Torcy*, as appears by his \* Correspondence with Lord *Bolingbroke*, very frankly made no Scruple of telling the *English* before-hand, that this Expedient, which had been devised to prevent the Union of *France* and *Spain* under one Monarch, would be of little Force, as being inconsistent with the fundamental Laws of *France*; by this Declaration giving us a very remarkable Instance of the Weakness, or of the Wickedness of our then Ministers, who could build the Peace of *Europe* on so sandy a Foundation, and accept of Terms which *France* itself was honest enough to own were not to be kept.

However, the *Regent* was resolved to support his Claim to the Crown of *France*, in Exclusion

\* See the Report of the secret Committee, p. 13. The following Extract from a Letter of *Monf. Torcy* to Mr *St John* is remarkable. "The Renunciation desired would be null and "invalid by the fundamental Laws of *France*; according to "which Laws the most near Prince to the Crown is, of Necessity, the Heir thereto.—This Law is looked upon, as the "Work of him who hath established all Monarchies, and we "are persuaded in *France* that God only can abolish it. No "Renunciation, therefore, can destroy it; and if the King of "Spain should renounce it for the Sake of Peace, and in Obedience to the King his Grandfather, they would deceive "themselves that received it as a sufficient Expedient to prevent the Mischief we propose to avoid."

to the *Spanish* Branch; and as the Support and Assistance of *England* was necessary for this Purpose, it is not to be wondered at that he should court the Friendship of a Nation from whom he had so much to expect; and, therefore, he was wise enough to do us Justice, by carrying into Execution, in some Degree, the Article relating to *Dunkirk*.

The personal Interest of the Regent was the only Reason for this Compliance: But succeeding Administrations in *France* not being influenced by the same private Views to adhere to Treaties solemnly ratified, *Dunkirk* began gradually to rise from its Ruins; its Port again received Ships; its Trade flourished; *England* saw itself deprived of this favourite Advantage gained at *Utrecht*; and such was the Ascendency of *French* Councils over those of this Island, at the Period I speak of, that we were actually engaged in Alliances with *France*, while that Nation was thus openly insulting us, and insulting us, without Obstruction, in so essential an Article. We all remember what passed in Parliament in 1733, relating to the Point now before us. — Such was the same Acquiescence of the *British* Administration, that *Dunkirk*, by this Time, stood upon our Customhouse-books as a Port, from whence great Imports were made; and when an Inquiry concerning this was proposed in the House of Commons by a great Parliament Man \*, since dead, the then Minister hung his Head, in the House, for Shame. And who could have believed it possible, that the same Person, who had been so ready to promote a parliamentary Inquiry into this Violation of the Peace in 1713, should obstruct such an Inquiry, when he

\* Sir William Wyndham.

himself

himself was in Power, though the Reasons for it had become much stronger? Who could see Him, without Indignation, shut his Eyes to the Re-establishment of *Dunkirk*, and obstruct the proposed Inquiry, by getting from Cardinal *Fleury*, (who then governed *France*, and, I blush to say it, *England* too) a delusive, ministerial Letter, promising what he knew would not be performed;—and obtained, perhaps, only because the Cardinal was assured, that the Breach of the Promise would not be refuted?

While *England* remained so averse to do itself Justice, no Wonder that *France* improved the Opportunity. At the Time when that *Minister* was obliged to retire from Power, the Re-establishment of *Dunkirk* was completed. For, within a few Months after \*, we find a Memorial presented by Lord *Stair* to the *Dutch*, complaining of this Violation of the Peace of *Utrecht*, and urging this as a Reason for their joining us against *France*. And as it is for the Honour of the Administration then entering into Office, that they began with Measures so spirited and national, it is equally remarkable, that the same Person, who had threatened *Lewis XIV.* in his own Palace, for his Slowness in demolishing *Dunkirk*, lived to be again employed by his Country at the Distance of near thirty Years, when the Restoration of *Dunkirk* became an Object of national Resentment.

The two Nations had not, as yet, begun the late War, when we saw, in *One* Instance, both a Proof that *Dunkirk* was again a *Port*, and a Port which may be made Use of to endanger the Safety of *Britain*. At the Time I now speak of †, we

\* The Memorial is dated July 1. 1742.

† In 1743-4.

beheld  
Tran  
der t  
taken  
no A  
Fleet  
Nati  
have  
T  
Trea  
(whi  
noth  
Nati  
was,  
store  
tial  
Trea  
it the  
Land  
Dem  
Trea  
the V  
Li  
sion  
sent  
fresh  
the  
Maje  
as on  
land  
since  
to it  
done  
his M  
bour  
Fleet  
threa  
Fran

beheld the Harbour of *Dunkirk* crouded with Transports to embark Count *Saxe* and the *Pretender* to invade us. And, if that Invasion had then taken Effect, from that very *Port* which was to be no *Port*, (happily the Winds were contrary to the Fleet from *Brest*), the infinite Mischief which this Nation may suffer from its Re-establishment, would have been fatally experienced.

Though we have no great Reason to brag of the Treaty made at the Conclusion of the last War, (which I am ashamed to call a Peace, as it settled nothing that was before in Doubt between the two Nations), the Peace of *Utrecht* concerning *Dunkirk*, was, nevertheless, in its most essential Part, restored to its full Force. I say, in its most *Essential Part*; because, though the 17th Article of the Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle* left *Dunkirk* in the State it then was, with regard to its Fortifications to the Land; the same Article revived our Right, to the Demolition of its Port, by stipulating, *That ancient Treaties are to be observed in regard to the Port, and the Works on the Sea-side*.

Little or nothing was done between the Conclusion of the Peace, and the breaking out of the present War, towards carrying into Execution this fresh Promise. On the contrary, the enlarging of the Fortifications of *Dunkirk*, is mentioned in his Majesty's Declaration of War, three Years ago, as one of the fresh Heads of Injury offered to *England*. And whoever reflects upon the Transactions, since that Period, will see that *Dunkirk* is restored to its original Importance. Its Privateers have done infinite Mischief to our Trade; a Squadron of his Majesty's Navy, in vain blocked up its Harbour lately, to prevent the sailing of *Thurot's* Fleet; and, it is well known, that the long threatened Invasion of these Kingdoms, which *France*, in Despair, certainly meditated, would have

have been attempted from this Place, if the Destruction of their Ships of War by *Hawk*, had not taught them the Absurdity of invading us in their much celebrated *flat-bottom Boats*, which, we may well suppose, will hardly be tried, when their Fleets, really formidable, have been destroyed in the Attempt.

The above Enumeration of *French* Infidelities, in general, and in particular their Behaviour to *England* with regard to *Dunkirk*, and with regard to *North-America*, so naturally points out the *Expediency*, and *Necessity* of the Hints I shall now offer, that, in proposing them, I may well hope not to have them ridiculed as the Reveries of a chimerical *St Pierre*, but rather attended to, as the sober Dictates of Prudence, and of a Zeal not altogether devoid of Knowledge.

First, Then, *my Lord, and Sir*, before you enter upon any New Treaty, or listen to any plausible Proposals whatever, insist that Justice may be done this Nation, with regard to former Treaties. Shew *France* the strong, the solemn Engagement she entered into at *Utrecht*, to demolish *Dunkirk*; put her in Mind of the amazing Perfidy with which she, from Time to Time, eluded the Performance of that Engagement; and demand *immediate* Justice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity in the ensuing Negotiation,

Be not deceived any longer in this Matter. The *French* will, no doubt, assure you, that the Demolition of *Dunkirk* shall be an Article in the New Treaty. But let them know, you are not to be so imposed upon. They will, to be sure, when this becomes a new Article, reckon it a new Concession on their Side, and expect something in return for it,—perhaps *Guadaloupe*, or some such Trifle, as they will call it. But tell them, with the Firmness of wise Conquerors, that the Demolition of  
*Dunkirk*

*Dun*  
mad  
be  
tion,  
shall

O  
quire  
ratio  
to th  
Real  
them  
than

If  
prev  
pect  
cerity  
enter  
ring  
Conf  
have  
this,  
such  
lied  
tion

Pe  
to co  
ning  
hono  
never  
them  
it the  
ago,  
of th  
we f  
canno  
away  
sity.

*Dunkirk* is what you are intitled to by Treaties made long ago, and violated; and that it shall not be so much as mentioned in the insuing Negotiation, but complied with, before that Negotiation shall commence.

Or, admitting that no Concession should be required by *France* in the New Treaty, in Consideration of a New Article to demolish *Dunkirk*, place to them, in the strongest Light, the unanswerable Reasons we have against putting any Confidence in them, that such an Article would be better executed, than that in the Treaty of *Utrecht* has been.

If they refuse doing us this immediate Justice, previous to the Peace; ask them, how they can expect that we should have any Reliance on their Sincerity to fulfil the New Engagements they may enter into, when they afford us so strong, so glaring an Instance of Infidelity, in an Article of such Consequence, made so many Years ago? Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refuses this, at the very Time he is treating, affords you such manifest Proof, that his Word is not to be relied upon, and that you cannot trust to the Execution of any Promise ever so solemnly made?

Perhaps *France* may think it a Disgrace to them, to comply with any Thing previous to the beginning of a Negotiation. Tell them, that acting honourably, and doing what Justice requires, can never be disgraceful. But if it be a Disgrace, tell them, with the Spirit of honest Men, that we owe it them, for the greater Disgrace they put, not long ago, upon us, by requiring us to send two Peers of this Realm to remain in *France* as *Hostages*, till we surrendered *Louisburg*; an Indignity which I cannot call to mind, without Pain; and which, I always thought was submitted to without Necessity.

E

It

It is now our Turn to vindicate the Honour of our Nation; and as *Dunkirk* was put into our Possession before the Treaty of *Utrecht*, as a Pledge of the *French* Sincerity, and to continue in our Possession, till the Demolition should be completed; let some such Expedient be now agreed upon; with this Difference only, that instead of *five Months after the Peace*, the Time fixed, for the Demolition, at *Utrecht*, let no Peace be signed, at present, till this Right acquired to us by former Treaties, and of which we have been so perfidiously robbed, be actually carried into full Execution.

However, if any insuperable Difficulties should attend the doing ourselves Justice, on this Head, before the Peace; if, for Instance, which perhaps may be the Case, it should be found, that it cannot be complied with, unless we consent to a *Cessation of Arms*, during the Time of Negotiation; rather than give *France* that Opportunity of recovering from its Distresses, and of being protected from the Superiority of our Arms, before we have, finally, obliged them to accept of our own Terms of Peace, (which was one Cause of the Ruin of our Negotiation at *Utrecht*) I would wave insisting upon the Demolition of *Dunkirk*, before the Treaty, and think it sufficient to demand *Hostages* from them, as a Security that it shall be faithfully complied with, within a limited Time after the Treaty shall be concluded. The *Parisians* had two *English* *Milords* to stare at, upon the last Peace; and I do not see why the Curiosity of our *Londoners* should not be gratified, in the same Way; and Two *Ducs & Pairs* of *France* be sent as *Hostages* to *England*, till *Dunkirk* cease to be a Port.

I know well, that Political Opinions, concerning the Importance of any particular Object, are as frequently dictated by Whim and Fashion, as built

on

on  
may  
the  
it  
Na  
this  
cun  
Dis  
bee  
scar  
othe  
ched  
rabl  
forg  
to  
Hon  
Peac  
this  
the  
shew  
cula  
Inju  
whe  
them  
kirk  
the  
Succ  
unab  
its a  
fame  
Sea  
End  
Flee  
the  
than  
num  
Dun

on solid Reason and Experience. Perhaps, some may think, that this is the Case, with Regard to the Necessity of demolishing *Dunkirk*. But though it may not at present be so favourite an Object of National Politics as it was in the Queen's Time, this has not been owing to any real Change of Circumstances, but to another Cause, to the *American* Disputes between the two Nations, which have been the great Object of the present War, and scarcely permitted us, hitherto, to reflect, in what other Instances, the Infidelities of *France* must be checked at the ensuing Peace.—But as this desirable Event now approaches, we cannot forget, or forgive the Behaviour of our Enemies with Regard to *Dunkirk*; and it will be equally necessary for the *Honour* and for the *Interest* of this nation to make no Peace, without obtaining full Satisfaction on this Head. It will be necessary for the *Honour* of the Nation to insist upon this, if it were only, to shew to *Europe* in general, and to *France* in particular—That we have too much Spirit not to resent Injuries; and too much Wisdom not to take Care, when we have it happily in our Power, to prevent them for the future.—But the Demolition of *Dunkirk* is also necessary, if we would take Care of *the Interest* of the Nation. Such hath been our Success, in destroying the Navy of *France*; and so unable doth that Kingdom now appear, to carry on its ambitious Projects by Land, and to vie at the same Time, with *England*, for Dominion on the Sea; that we may reasonably suppose, there is an End of *Brest* and *Toulon* Squadrons, to face our Fleets; and a future War with *England*, will leave the *French* no other Way of distressing us by Sea, than to lie in watch for our Merchant Ships, with numberless Privateers. In such a piratical War, *Dunkirk*, if its Harbour be not now destroyed,

will, too late, be found to be of infinite Consequence; and we shall fatally experience it again, what it was in the Queen's Time, and in the Language of her Parliament, *a Nest of Pyrates, infesting the Ocean, and doing infinite Mischief to Trade* \*.

For these Reasons, therefore, I am so *old-fashioned* as to expect that our Plenipotentiaries will have this Point properly stated to them in their Instructions, and that *Delenda est Carthago, Demolish Dunkirk*, will be a Preliminary Article in the ensuing Negotiation.

The War having begun, principally, with a View to do ourselves Justice in *North America*, the Regulation of Matters, on that Continent, ought to be, and no Doubt, will be, the capital Article relating to *England*, in the coming Treaty. It will be necessary, therefore, to give you my Sentiments on this Head; and while I do it, with all becoming Diffidence, I shall, at the same Time, support what I may offer, with Reasons appearing so strong to me, as may perhaps recommend it to your farther Consideration, though it should fail of producing Conviction.

Now it is with the greatest Pleasure I would observe, that with regard to *North America*, we have nothing to ask, at the Peace, which we have not already made ourselves Masters of, during the War. We have been blessed by Heaven, with a Success, in that Part of the World, scarcely to be paralleled in History. The Rashness of *Braddock*, the Inexperience of *Shirley*, the Inactivity of *Loudoun*, and the Ill-success of *Abercrombie*, seem only to have been so many necessary Means of producing that Unanimity in our Colonies, that Spirit in our

\* See above p. 18.

Troops,

Troops, and that steady Perseverance in our Ministers, as hath not only recovered from the Enemy all his Usurpations, but *Louisburg* is an *English* Harbour; *Quebec*, the Capital of *Canada*, is already in our Possession; and the Rest of that Country will fall of Course. It is a Prospect still more agreeable, that by destroying the Naval Force of *France*, our *North-American* Conquests cannot be retaken; and the Principle I would now lay down, and which I would recommend it to you to adopt, is, *not to give up any of them*. And I I shall now endeavour to prove to you, that such a Demand may be insisted upon, without giving the Enemy any Pretence for accusing us of Insolence towards them; and cannot be omitted without giving the Nation just Reason to Complain, that we have consented to a *treacherous* and *delusive* Peace.

It cannot, surely, ever enter the Imagination of a *British* Administration, to make Peace, without, at least, keeping in our Possession, all those Places, where the *French* had settled themselves, in Violation of former Treaties, and from which we have, fortunately, driven them. Upon this Plan, then, we shall, at the Peace, be left in Possession not only of the *Peninsula* of *Acadia*, but of All *Nova Scotia*, according to its old Limits; the Bay of *Fundi*, and the River *St John*.—The important Conquests of *Crown Point*, and *Niagara*, will not be relinquished; and *Fort du Quesne*, and the Country near the *Ohio*, will remain Ours.—They are already Ours; the *French* know they cannot get them back during the War, and they do not expect that we shall give them up at the *Peace*.

But though Care should be taken to keep all those Places just mentioned; something more must be done, or our *American* Colonies will tell you, you have

Troops,

have done *Nothing*. In a Word, you must keep *Canada*, otherwise you lay the Foundation of another War.

The Necessity of this may be placed in so striking a View, as to silence the *French* Plenipotentiaries, and to convince all *Europe*, of the *Justice* of our Demand.

Ask the *French*, what Security they can give you, if we restore *Canada* to them, however restrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence? If the Treaty of *Utrecht* could not keep them from Encroachments, what Reason can we have to suppose the future Treaty will be better observed? If the *French* are left at *Montreal*, and the *three Rivers*, can we be certain they will not again cross the *Champlain Lake*, and attack *Crown Point*? If the River *St Lawrence* be still theirs, what is to insure us against an Expedition to *Niagara*? Can we flatter ourselves, that a People, who in full Peace, erected those two Fortresses, in direct Violation of their Faith plighted at *Utrecht*, will be restrained, by any future Treaty, from attempting, also in full Peace, to recover them? After having seen the *French* carrying on a regular Plan of Usurpation, in *North America*, for these Forty Years past, shall we be so weak as to believe that they will now lay it aside? No, depend upon it, if the *French* think it worth their while to ask back that Part of *North America*, which was their own, they mean to take a proper Opportunity, of *Elbowing all our Colonies round about*, and of resuming the same ambitious Views of Enlargement which the most sacred Ties of former Treaties could not restrain.

The Truth of the Matter is, they were tired of *Canada*. The Inclemency of the Climate, the difficult Access to it; and a Trade scarcely defraying

ing  
hav  
exte  
Eng  
Lou  
per  
ing  
ther  
Inju  
gag  
be  
selv  
unle  
Bod  
imm  
the  
not  
Cou  
Let  
the  
be  
so  
read  
gain  
ter  
Enc  
we  
Mil  
and  
Cou  
we  
pro  
have  
viol  
I  
tati  
Fate

ing the Expence of the Colony, would long ago have enduced them to abandon it, if the plan of extending its Boundaries, at the Expence of the *English*, and of opening its Communication with *Louisiana* and with the Ocean, had not made them persevere. — *Canada* itself is not worth their asking; and if they do desire to have it restored to them, it can only be with a view to repeat the same Injuries and Infidelities, to punish which, we engaged in the present War. Unless, therefore, we be resolved, *with our eyes open*, to expose ourselves to a Repetition of former Encroachments; unless we would choose to be obliged to keep great Bodies of Troops, in *America*, in full peace, at an immense Expence; we can never consent to leave the *French* any Footing in *Canada*. If we do not exclude them, *absolutely* and *entirely* from that Country, we shall soon find we have done nothing. Let the Treaty be drawn ever so accurately; let the Boundaries between *Canada* and our Colonies, be described ever so precisely, and regulated ever so much in our Favour; what has happened already, ought to teach us what we may expect again; the future Treaty will be observed no better than the former have been; Usurpation and Encroachment will gradually revive; and thus shall we have thrown away all our Successes; so many Millions will have been expended to no Purpose; and the Blood of so many Thousands of our brave Countrymen spilt, only to remind us, that though we knew how to conquer, we knew not how to improve, perhaps, the only Opportunity we shall ever have, of putting it out of the Power of *France* to violate its Faith.

I take it for granted that, in the future Negotiation, the Island of *Cape Breton* will follow the Fate of *Quebec*; I shall only observe with Regard  
to

to it, that though the Harbour and Fortification of *Louisburg*, be of infinite service to *France*; it can be of little or no Use to *England*, if *Canada* be left to us. It is of Consequence to *France*, as a Retreat to their Ships fishing on the neighbouring Banks of *Newfoundland*; and as a Security to the Entrance of the *Gulph* of *St Laurence*. But the Possession of *Newfoundland* itself, makes *Louisburg* of no Utility to the *English*, in the former Respect; and *Halifax*, where we have a good Harbour, answers very nearly the latter Purpose. Upon this View therefore, may we not hope and expect, that the Necessity of garrisoning *Louisburg* having ended with the Conquest of *Quebec*, its Fate will be determined, without troubling the *French* Plenipotentiaries? Without waiting for a Congress, let Orders be forthwith sent to demolish it, so as not to leave one Stone upon another, of the Fortifications; to remove the Inhabitants to *Nova Scotia*, a better Country; and to leave the Island, a bare and barren Rock; the State it was in, before the peace of *Utrecht* gave leave to *France* to fortify it. If the Right given to the *French* by the 13th Article of the same Peace, to fish in some Parts of those Seas should be continued, (and I could wish to see it continued, as the Refusal of it would be rather unreasonable), let *Cape Breton* unfortified, and ungarrisoned be left open to them; and a few Men of War kept at *Halifax*, will effectually prevent *Louisburg's* being again made a Place of Strength.

If you adopt this Measure, I should be inclined to think, *France* will see that you know your true Interests; and that you are resolved steadily to pursue them. And If they should make any Remonstrances against it, tell them they may follow *our* Example and demolish, if they please, the Fortifications of *Mahon*; which we see them possess with

with as great Indifference as we remember the Circumstances of its Loss, with Shame: Which, as being of no Use to them, they will not desire to keep, and which, having been kept, by us, at an Expence not counterbalanced by its Utility, we shall not be very sanguine about recovering. Or, rather tell them, that in demolishing *Louisburg*, before the Peace, we only copy a former Example given us by themselves, when their Troops were employed in dismantling the frontier Towns in *Flanders*, at the very Time that their Plenipotentiaries at *Aix-la-Chapelle* were consenting to give them up.

The Plan which I have had the Honour of sketching out to you, besides being so reasonable in itself, is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expressed by his Majesty, in his Speech, of *not having entered into the War with Views of Ambition*. The Possession of *Canada*, is no View of Ambition; it is the only Security the *French* can give us, for their future Regard to Treaties. We have made other Conquests, of great Importance, our Management of which will give us sufficient Means of shewing our Moderation. And though I shall not presume to give any Opinion about the future Disposal of them, I think, however, I may be allowed to hint, that "the Possession of *Guadalupe*," an additional Sugar island, when we have so many of our own, ought not to be insisted upon so strenuously as to make it a necessary Condition of the Peace. And though "*Senegal* and *Goree*," are of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own *African* Settlements have hitherto supplied as with Slaves, sufficient for our *American* Purposes: And the Trade for Gum is, perhaps, not of Consequence enough to make us Amends for the annual Mortality, which we already lament, of our brave Countrymen, to guard our *African* Conquests. The

People of *England*, therefore, will not, I believe, blame the giving them back, for a valuable Consideration, — provided *Canada* be left to us.

To consider this Affair in its proper Light, it will be necessary to reflect on the infinite Consequence of *North America* to this Country. Our Colonies there contain above a Million of Inhabitants, who are mostly supplied with the Manufactures of *Great Britain*; our Trade to them, by employing innumerable Ships, is one great Source of our maritime Strength; by supporting our Sugar Islands with their Provisions, and other Necessaries, they pour in upon us all the Riches of the *West Indies*; we carry their Rice, and Tobacco, and Fish, to all the Markets of *Europe*; they produce Indigo, and Iron; and the whole Navy of *England* may be equipped, with the Products of *English America*. And if, notwithstanding our having lost several Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed in *Europe* and to the *Levant*, we have still more Commerce than ever; a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vast Increase of our shipping; what can this be owing to, but to the Trade to our own *American Colonies*; a Trade which the Successes of this War will render, every Day, more and more advantageous? If this Matter, then, be considered, in the above Light, by those whom I now address, they will make our *North American* Conquests the *sine qua non* of the Peace, as being the only method of guarding our *invaluable Possessions* there, from Usurpations and Encroachments; and they will look upon every other Conquest, we have made, *or may make*, in other Parts of the World, as Instruments put into our Hands by Providence, to enable us to settle Affairs on the Continent of *Europe*, as advantageously to our Allies, as *our* Gratitude could wish, and as *their* Fidelity doth deserve.

Here,

Here, then, let me change the Scene, and having settled our Affairs in *Canada* (would to God they were so settled at the Peace!) permit me to finish my Plan of Negotiation, by giving my Sentiments on the Part we ought to act, to obtain a proper Settlement of Affairs in *Germany*.

If a great Number of Allies can make themselves formidable to a common Enemy, during the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin every Advantage they may have gained, by quarrelling amongst themselves, when they begin their Negotiations for Peace. Like an *Opposition*, in our Parliament, carried on against an overgrown Minister, all Sorts of Parties and Connections, all Sorts of disagreeing and contradictory Interests, join against him, at first, as a common Enemy; and tolerable Unanimity is preserved amongst them, so long as the Fate of this Parliamentary War continues in Suspence. But when once they have driven him to the Wall, and think themselves sure of Victory; the Jealousies and Suspicions, which, while the Contest depended, had been stifled, break out; every one who shared in the Fatigue, expects to share in the Spoils; separate Interests counteract each other; separate Negotiations are set on Foot; till at last, by *untimely* and *mercenary* Divisions, they lose the Fruits of their Victory, and the Object of the common Resentment is able to make Terms for himself\*.—This was exactly the Case, in the Contest between *Lewis XIV.* and the Princes of *Europe* united against him, before the Peace of *Utrecht*; and the unhappy Divisions of the Allies (Divisions too likely to have sprung up,

\* The true History of the Transaction here alluded to, may, possibly, some Time or other, appear; though, as yet, we are persuaded, the World knows very little of it.

even though there had not been a Party in *England*, who to gratify their private Resentments, blew up the Coals of Dissention) gave the *French* the Means of procuring more favourable Terms of Peace, than they could well have hoped after so unsuccessful a War.

I have mentioned this, with a View to observe, that the Circumstances of the present War on the Continent are very different; no such unfortunate Disunion seems possible to happen to us, though it may happen amongst the Confederates who are engaged on the same Side with *France*, against *Hanover* and the King of *Prussia*.

It may be collected from more than one Hint dropt in the Course of this Letter, that I am no Friend to *Continental Measures* in general; especially such continental Measures as engaged us during the three last Wars, as Principals; when we seemed eager to ruin ourselves, in Support of that *Austrian* Family whom we now find, with unparalleled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in close Alliance with *France*.—But the *Continental Measures* now adopted by *England* were necessary, both with Regard to Our Honour and Our Interest. *Hanover* has been attacked by *France*, on a Quarrel entirely *English*; and though Care was taken, by the Act of Settlement, that *England* should not be involved in Wars on Account of *Hanover*; yet Gratitude, Honour, the Reputation of our Country, every Motive of Generosity, bound us, not to allow the innocent Electorate to be ruined for *England's American* Quarrel with *France*. In Regard to our Interest, no *English* Minister, however inflexible in his Attachment to his native Country, could have devised the Means of making the best Use of our *American* Conquests, if the *French* could have treated with *Hanover* in their Hands. It was with

with a View to prevent this, to oppose the *French* in their Projects in *Germany*, the Success of which would have been so detrimental to *England*, that we *honestly* and *wisely* have formed and have maintained the Army *now* commanded by Prince *Ferdinand*; and have entered into an Alliance with the King of *Prussia*.

But though this was a Measure of Prudence, it was scarcely possible for the wisest Statesmen to foresee all those great Consequences which it hath already produced. The Efforts which the *French* have made in *Germany*, and the Resistance they have there met with by the Care of the *British* Administration, have contributed more than perhaps we could expect, to our Success in *America*, and other Parts of the World. Full of the Project of conquering *Hanover*, *France* saw herself obliged to engage in exorbitant Expences; Armies were to be paid, and maintained in *Westphalia* and on the *Rhine*; vast Sums were to be advanced to the Court of *Vienna* always as indigent as it is haughty; the ravenous *Russians*, and the degenerate *Swedes*, would not move, unless allured by Subsidies; and the Mouth of every hungry *German* Prince was to be stopt, with the *Louis D'ors* of *France*. Involved in Expences thus enormous, our Enemies have been prevented from strengthening themselves at Sea, where *England* had most Reason to dread their becoming strong.

The infinite Advantages which this Nation hath reaped from the *German* War, are indeed now so well understood, that we have seen the greatest Enemies of this *Measure* acknowledge their Mistake.

They now confess, that if we had not resisted *France*, in her Projects of *German* Conquests, her best Troops had not been destroyed; her own Coasts would have been better protected; she would

would have been able to pay more Attention to her *American* Concerns; England might have been threatened, so seriously, with Invasions, as to be afraid of parting with those numerous Armies which have conquered, at such a Distance from Home. In a Word, that universal Bankruptcy, which hath crowned the Distresses of *France*, and gives *England* greater Reason of Exultation, than any Event of the War, might have been prevented. It is entirely owing to the *German* Part of the War that *France* appears thus low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches; that she is found to be a sinking Monarchy, nay a Monarchy already sunk. And, perhaps, it might be an Inquiry worthy of another *Montesquieu*, to assign the *Causes of the Rise and Fall* of the *French* Monarchy; and to point out those silent Principles of Decay which have, in our Times, made so rapid a Progress, that *France*, in 1712, after upwards of twenty Years almost constant War, maintained against all *Europe*, was still more respectable, and less exhausted than it now appears to be, when the *single* Arm of *Great Britain* is lifted up against her, and the War has lasted no more than three or four Years.

If this then be the State of the War in *Germany*; if *England* be bound to take a Part in it, by every Motive of Honour and Interest; and if the infinite Advantages it hath already produced, be stated fairly—the Inference I would draw, and which I believe the whole Nation will also draw, is, that we should continue to exert those Endeavours, which hitherto have been so effectual in defeating the Designs of *France*, to get Possession of *Hanover*.

His Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, has no Views of Ambition: His Country has been attacked only because it belonged to the King of *Great Britain*: and nothing more is required of us, but to be true to ourselves, by neglecting no Step that may prevent

vent  
Fra  
fron  
and  
need  
Arm  
hath  
Rbi  
paig  
Peac  
Adv  
Arm  
alrea  
form  
Thou  
since  
the  
of A  
in G  
It  
speak  
Succ  
King  
the a  
attac  
rates  
an e  
up,  
of th  
Ruff  
of th  
diti  
when  
ties t  
rathe  
that  
our I

vent *Hanover* from falling again into the Hands of *France*, after having been so miraculously rescued from the Contributions of the rapacious *Richlieu*, and saved from the *Military Desert* of *Belleisle*.—I need not say any Thing of the Glory acquired by that Army, which notwithstanding its great Inferiority, hath driven the *French* twice from the *Wefer* to the *Rhine*. I shall only observe, that the next Campaign (if another Campaign should preceed the Peace) will, in all Probability, lose us none of the Advantages we have gained, *on that Side*; if our Army, still headed by Prince *Ferdinand*, who has already gained so many Laurels, be rendered more formidable, as I hope it will, by sending to it *some Thousands* more of our national Troops; who now, since the Conquest of *Canada*, and the Defeat of the long threatened Invasion, have no other Scene of Action left, but to contribute to another Victory in *Germany*.

It would be a very pleasing Prospect, if we could speak with equal Confidence, and Probability of Success, concerning the future Operations of the King of *Prussia*. However, when we reflect on the amazing Difficulties he has had to struggle with; attacked on every Side by a Number of Confederates, each of whom, singly, one would have thought an equal Match for his whole Strength; bearing up, at the same Time, against the formidable Power of the House of *Austria*; the brutal Ferocity of the *Russians*; the Attacks of the *Swedes*; the Armies of the Empire; and, at one Time, having the additional Weight of the *French* Arms upon him; when, I say, we reflect on the uncommon Difficulties this magnanimous Prince has to resist, we must rather express our Wonder, and our Satisfaction that his Situation is still so respectable, than indulge our Fears, that it is likely to be worse. The severest

rest Checks he has met with during this War, have only served to shew how calm he possesses himself under Distress, and how ably he can extricate himself. The Hour of Adversity has called forth all his Abilities, and if he has failed sometimes, from too great an Eagerness to conquer, he has always been able to retrieve his Affairs, and like *Anteus*, gained fresh Strength from every Overthrow.

And, upon this Principle, I flatter myself, his *Prussian* Majesty will still be able to secure to himself the greater Part, if not the whole of *Saxony* for his Winter Quarters, and to recruit his Army, no Doubt much shattered with its Losses and Fatigues, before the opening of another Campaign. It is to be hoped also, that besides the amazing Resources he has still left in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous and effectual Support which his Connection with *England*, affords him; the Power of the Confederacy against him may be broken, by disuniting the Confederates. History satisfies us how seldom a Confederacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a single Power attacked. I have given one Instance of this already, when I spoke of the Grand Alliance against *Lewis XIV.* and the League of *Cambray* against the *Venetians*, in the 16th Century, is an Instance still more remarkable.

But, if contrary to our Hopes, our Wishes, our Endeavours, this should fail; if his *Prussian* Majesty, like a Lion caught in the Toils, (after a Resistance already made, which will hand him down to Posterity as the greatest of Men), should at last be unable to defend himself; let him not despair while he is in Alliance with *Britain*: For I would inculcate a Doctrine, which I think will not be

unpopular

unpo  
there  
fters.  
what  
Fren  
all on  
Fran  
be the  
any u  
Pe  
to bo  
not b  
that  
of Pr  
Proter  
of the  
if the  
be def  
lessa fr  
War  
gion  
severan  
of a  
Engag  
Hanov  
titude  
vereign  
of his  
can ca  
Nation  
that o  
approv  
they fl  
of our  
will be  
may m

unpopular amongst my Countrymen, and which, therefore, I hope, will not be opposed by our Ministers, *That whatever Conquests we have made, and whatever Conquests we may still make, upon the French, except North America, which must be kept all our own; should be looked upon as given back to France for a most important Consideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Prussia from any unforeseen Distresses.*

Perhaps my Notions on this Subject may seem to border on Enthusiasm; but, however, I cannot but be persuaded, that Things are come to that Pass in *Germany*, that the Ruin of the King of *Prussia* will be soon followed by the Ruin of the Protestant Religion in the Empire. The blind Zeal of the bigotted *Austrian* Family will have no Check, if the Head and Protector of the *German* Protestants be destroyed; and the War begun only to wrest *Silesia* from him, will, in the End, be found to be a War that will overturn the Liberties and Religion of *Germany*. If, therefore, the noble Perseverance of the King of *Prussia* deserves the Esteem of a generous People; if his Fidelity to his Engagements, which has contributed to save *Hanover* and to ruin *France*, can demand our Gratitude; if the Danger of the only Protestant Sovereign in *Germany*, able to preserve the Privileges of his Religion from being trampled under Foot, can call forth the warm Support of this Protestant Nation; may I not hope, may I not be confident, that our Ministers will dictate, and our People approve of Terms of Peace in his Favour, though they should be purchased by relinquishing some of our Conquests; while the Possession of *Canada* will be so reasonable a Bound to the Demands we may make for ourselves?

I have stated this Point, upon a Supposition that the Event of the War may turn out to the Disadvantage of the King of *Prussia*. But if the Fortune, the Capacity, the Perseverance of that Great Prince, should enable him (as I think we may still hope) to extricate himself from the Dangers that surround him——it may be asked, What is to be done with the Conquests which, besides *Canada*, we shall be in Possession of when we treat of a Peace?—My Proposal is honest, and perhaps will not be treated as chimerical: Employ them to recover out of the Hands of *France* those Towns of *Flanders*, gained for the *Austrian* Family by the Valour, and at the Expence of *England*; and which have been so perfidiously sacrificed. A *British* Administration must tremble at the Prospect of seeing *Newport* and *Ostend* become *French* Property, and, therefore, should use their utmost Endeavours to prevent this at the Peace; though those Endeavours may serve the Court of *Vienna*, whose Ingratitude to *Britain* never will be forgotten; though at the same Time, I must own we shall draw no small Advantage from it. We shall learn, for the future, to prefer our own Interest to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the Continent to the immediate Exigencies of our own Country, and never to assist a *new* Ally, without remembering how much we did for *our Old one*, and what Return we have had!

I have, now, nearly executed my principal Design, in the present Address; which was to give my Thoughts on the important Business of the approaching Treaty. And if it be conducted with as much Ability, as the War has been carried on with Spirit and Success, there is great Room for flattering ourselves, that the Voice of the Public demands no Advantages or Cessions, in Favour of  
*England,*

*England*, which the Ministers of *England* are not resolved to insist upon.

But amidst the signal Successes of our Arms, which give us so reasonable an Expectation of an honourable Peace, and have exalted our Country to the highest Pinacle of Glory and Reputation abroad—I wish it could be said that our *Constitution* was not greatly in Danger of being hurt, and almost lost, at *Home*.—I shall beg leave to take this Occasion of touching this equally melancholy and important Subject, with a View, not to blame, but to lament; not to bring any railing Accusation against those who are now in Power, but to exhort and to excite them to endeavour, before it be too late, to add to the Services they have done their Country, in saving it from the open Attacks of *France*, the still more important Service of saving our Constitution, which some unhappy Circumstances of our present Situation have already greatly changed, and seem to threaten with entire Destruction;—nay, I may say, would have actually destroyed, if it were not for the good Heart of our gracious Sovereign, who scorns to take Advantage of them.

Considerably above an hundred Millions of Debt, the Sum we must be obliged to sit down with, at the End of the present War, is a Burden, which, however immense, Experience has taught us, contrary to all Theory, we shall be able to bear without *Bankruptcy*. As our Expences have increased, we have found, contrary to the Predictions of gloomy Politicians, that our Abilities to bear them have increased also.—But though our Debts be not too great for the Riches of our Country, they are much too great for the Independency of its Constitution. For, when I consider the infinite Dependence upon the Crown, created by Means of them, throughout the Kingdom, amongst all Degrees of

Men; when I reflect on the many Thousands of Placemen, of every Denomination, who are employed in the Collection of the vast Variety of Taxes now levied on the Public; and take a Review of a far greater Number of Servants of the Crown, both civil and military, for whose Support so considerable a Share of the public Revenue is set apart, too many of whom, I fear, might be tempted to assist in extending the Influence of the Prerogative to the Prejudice of public Liberty; when I consider our vast Load of Taxes, in this Point of View, I cannot help observing the amazing Revolution in our Government which this single *Article* has brought about; nor enough lament the unhappy Circumstances of Affairs, and the Necessities of the War which have forced us to an annual Expence, unknown to former Times, and which will almost be incredible to Posterity. I believe I can venture to say upon Memory, that the Expences of the War, for all King *William's* Reign, about 13 Years, were not, at a Medium, above 3 Millions and a Half a Year; and Queen *Anne's*, though the last Years were exorbitant, were little more than 5 Millions. What they are *now* I sigh to think on. Twelve or Fourteen Millions are demanded without Reserve; and, what is still more, voted without Opposition. Nay, of so little Consequence is it now thought, by our Representatives, to deliberate on the weighty Business of raising Money on the Subject, that scarcely can *Forty* of them be got together, to hear the Estimates for at least *One hundred and fourscore Thousand* Men, for so many we have now in our Pay; and to borrow *Eight Millions*, the Sum by which our Expences exceed our Income.

These are alarming Considerations; but another Object, no less threatening the Ruin of our Constitution, also presents itself.

I am

I am old enough to remember what Uneasiness and Jealousies disturbed the Minds of all true Patriots, with regard to standing Armies, and military Establishments. Principles of Liberty in general, and, in particular, Whig Principles, excited this Uneasiness and produced those Jealousies, which, from Time to Time, have been a fruitful Source of Parliamentary Debate. It was no longer ago than the late King's Time, that the vesting *Court-martial*, in Time of Peace, with the Power of punishing *Mutiny* and *Desertion* with *Death*, was carried in the House of Commons by a small Majority\*. Nay, that a Court-martial, however limited in its Jurisdiction, was inconsistent with the Liberties of a free People in Time of Peace, was the Doctrine of Whigs in those Days; it was the Doctrine, in particular, of Sir *Robert Walpole* then in Opposition; whose remarkable Expression, in this great Debate, "That they who gave the *Power of Blood*, gave *Blood*," never can be forgotten. And though afterwards, when he came to be a *Minister*, he was better reconciled to standing Armies and Mutiny-bills, in Time of Peace, *seventeen* thousand Men, was all the Army he *durst* ask; yet even that Demand produced an *annual* Debate; and the *annual* Reason, on which he founded the Necessity of his Demand — being the Danger from the Pretender and the Jacobites; was the strongest Proof, that even in Sir *R. Walpole's* Opinion, the Reduction in the Army should take Place, when this Danger from Disaffection should cease. But how are things changed? — I own indeed that amidst the Dangers of this War, and the threats of an Invasion, the vast Army now on our Esta-

\* In 1717-18 the Numbers on the Division were 247 to 229.

blishment,

blishment, is necessary : But what I lament is, to see the Sentiments of the Nation so amazingly reconciled to the Prospect of having a far more numerous Body of regular Troops kept up, after the Peace, than any true Lover of his Country in former Times thought, could be allowed without endangering the Constitution. Nay so unaccountably fond are we become of the military Plan, that the Erection of Barracks, which, twenty Years ago, would have ruined any Minister who should have ventured to propose it, may be proposed safely by our Ministers now a-days, and, upon Trial, be found to be a favourite Measure with our Patriots, and with the Public in general.

But what I lament as the greatest Misfortune that can threaten the public Liberty, is, to see the eagerness with which our Nobility, born to be the Guardians of the Constitution against Prerogative, solicit the Badge of *military* Subjection, not merely to serve their Country, in Times of Danger, which would be commendable, but in Expectation to be continued *Soldiers*, when Tranquillity shall be restored, and to be under *military Command*, during Life. When I see this strange, but melancholy Infatuation, so prevalent, I almost despair of the Constitution. If it should go on in Proportion as it has of late, I fear the Time will, at last, come, when Independence on the Crown, will be exploded as unfashionable. Unless another Spirit possess our Nobility; unless they lay aside their military Trappings; and think that they can serve their Country more effectually as Senators than as Soldiers, what can we expect, but to see the System of military Subordination extending itself throughout the Kingdom, universal Dependence upon Government influencing every Rank of Men, and the Spirit,

nay

may the very Form of the Constitution destroyed? We have generally beaten the *French*, and always been foolish enough to follow their Fashions; I was in Hopes we should never have taken the Fashion of *French* Government; but from our numerous Armies, and the military Turn of our Nobility, I am afraid we are running into it as fast as we can. And, unless something can be done, to bring back our Constitution to its first Principles, we shall find, that we have triumphed, only to make ourselves as wretched as our Enemy; that our Conquests are but a poor Compensation for the Loss of our Liberties; in a Word, that, like *Wolfe*, falling in the Arms of Victory, we are most gloriously—*undone*!

But though I have drawn so melancholy a Picture, of the Dangers which threaten us with the Loss of our Liberties, it is with no other Design, than to exhort those who are placed at the Helm, to set about the Repairs of our shattered Vessel, as soon as she can be brought safe into Harbour. After the Peace is once settled, it ought to be the great Object of our Ministers, to devise every Expedient, and to adopt every Plan, that may extricate this unhappy Constitution from the Dangers I have described. Considering the low Ebb of *France*, we have some Reason to hope that when Peace is once restored, upon solid Terms, it will not soon be interrupted. Much, therefore, may be done during those Years of Tranquillity; if our Ministers be diligent and faithful in this great Work of reviving the Constitution. The sacred and inviolable Application of the *Sinking-fund*, which the Increase of our Trade, and other Circumstances, have so greatly augmented, and must still augment, will operate gradually, and effectually. Universal and invariable Oeconomy, must

must be introduced into every Branch of Government; the Revenues of the Kingdom may be vastly increased by adopting Schemes that will prevent Frauds, and lessen the Expence of Collection; innumerable unnecessary Places may be abolished, and exorbitant Perquisites, in those we leave, may be restrained; Attention must be had to the Morals and Principles of the Nation, and the Revival of Virtue and of Religion will go hand in hand, with the Revival of Liberty. But no Object will deserve more Attention, than our Military Encroachments on Constitutional Independence. When this War shall be over, there will be less Reason, than ever, for numerous Armies. The Kingdom now happily being united, and Disaffection to the Royal Family at an End, we need fear no Rebellions among ourselves; and Invasions from *France* are less likely than ever. Besides, by the Care and Perseverance of some Patriots, we have acquired a new internal Strength, a Militia trained up to be useful, and consequently, we may without any Danger to the Public, reduce the Number of our Guards and Garrisons, so low, as to destroy great Part of the huge Fabric of Military Influence and Dependence. But whatever you do, if you mean to restore the Constitution, you must secure the Dignity and Independence of Parliament. After passing such Laws as may still be necessary to preserve the Freedom of Elections, from Influence of every Sort; to punish Bribery both in the *Electors* and in the *Elected*; something, perhaps, may still be done by Way of Place-bill, to lessen ministerial Influence over Parliaments, without having Recourse to an *Oliverian* Self-denying Ordinance; or to so total an Exclusion of Placemen as was established, in the original Act of Settlement.

And

And an House of Commons thus chosen, and thus made independent, now that *Jacobitism* is rooted out, can never be formidable but to those who have Reason to tremble. Such an House of Commons will co-operate with the Administration in every Plan of public Utility, and at the same Time inquire carefully into the Abuses of Government; Supplies will be voted; but only in proportion to the real Income and Abilities of the Nation; and we may expect to see, what we have not seen above these forty Years, a Parliamentary Commission of Accounts erected to inquire into the Disbursement of near *Two Hundred Millions*. And unless we see this soon, I shall look upon our Constitution as lost for ever.

These, and many such Regulations, as these may, under an honest and virtuous Administration, be adopted when once Peace is restored: And the Prospect of seeing them adopted, and steadily pursued, keeps me from despairing altogether of the *Commonwealth*.

To you, therefore, whose Power, most likely, will not terminate with the War; and whom I have presumed to address, with Regard to the Terms that should be demanded, to secure us from a perfidious Foe; to you, *My Lord*, and *Sir*, let me earnestly recommend, the still more important Care, of saving us from *ourselves*; and as you have with an Unanimity, that doth you both great Honour, directed our Councils, so as to humble *France*, let me intreat you to preserve your Union, till it re-invigorate the almost lost Powers of the *British Constitution*.

If you have any Regard to Virtue, to Liberty, to your Country; if you would live great, and die lamented; if you would shine in History, with our

H

*Clarendon*

And

*Clarendons* and *Southamptons*; let not this Opportunity, perhaps, this last Opportunity of saving *British* Liberty, and Independence, be thrown away. You, *my Lord*, whose Rank, whose extensive Influence, and Personal Authority, have given you the Pre-eminence, in public Affairs, as it were by Prescription; much will depend upon you, in the carrying on this important Work. But when I direct my Address to you, *Sir*, you must be conscious that besides the general Expectations we have from you, as a Lover of your Country, we have your own repeated Promises, and Declarations, to make us flatter ourselves that you will not stop short, in your Schemes of national Reformation. Not tutored in the School of Corruption, but lifted from your earliest Years, under the Banner of Patriotism; called into Power, by popular Approbation, and still uniting the uncommon Characters of *Minister* and *Patriot*; favourite of the Public and Servant of the Crown; be not offended, *Sir*, if I remind you, not to Disappoint that Confidence the Public places in your future Endeavours to prop the sinking Constitution. Nor let it ever fall from your Memory, that the Nation expects from your Virtue, your Oeconomy, your Plans for Liberty, during the future Peace, as great Advantages as we have already gained, from your Spirit, your bold Councils, and vigorous Efforts, in carrying on the present War.

Perhaps I grow too warm on a favourite Subject; and, therefore, from Schemes which cannot take Effect, till the War be closed, let me turn your Attention again, for a little while longer, to the Object immediately before our eyes,—the ensuing Conferences for Peace. And, with Regard to these, though I suppose, they will *begin*, before the Winter be over, I think there is some Reason for

for being of Opinion, that we must have another Campaign, before they can be finally closed. *France* is too low, to think seriously of a Peace, without making some desperate Effort. She never would have exposed her Weakness to all *Europe*, by so shameful and so humbling a Bankruptcy; She never would have ruined her public Credit, and melted her Plate, the last Resource, when every other has been exhausted, only to receive Terms from *England*. No, she knows she is undone for ever, if she gets no footing in *Hanover*; and, therefore, we may expect to see another Attempt made for that Purpose. But, if we are not wanting to ourselves, another Attempt will end, as unfortunately for her, as the former have done; and her Ruin only be more confirmed. In the mean while, I make no Doubt, the Plenipotentiaries will meet at a Congress; but the Events of the Field must regulate the Deliberations of the Cabinet. We, no Doubt, shall be *firm* in our Demands, *whatever they are*; and the *French* will endeavour to gain Time, to know whether there is any likelihood of obliging us to offer them *better*. In this Situation, then, *France* must hear with Terror, that without breaking our national Faith, without injuring private Property, without giving exorbitant Premiums, we have already provided *immensely* for the Supplies of *another Year* (and Supplies for *Years* may still be had) to meet them—not in *America*; there they are no more;—not on the *Ocean*—the Destruction of their Fleets leaves that Empire free to us—but once more, on the Plains of another *Minden*, again to feel and to confess the Superiority of *British* Valour.

I have only a Particular or two, to add, before I conclude. And I cannot help congratulating the Public, on the Wisdom of our  
H 2 Manner

Manner of Opening the Negotiation for Peace. I mean to observe, that our Ministers have happily got rid of a Set of very *useless*, or very *pernicious* Gentlemen called *Mediators*, by applying directly to the Enemy himself. Nothing can be more ridiculous than the Figure of the *Pope's* Nuncio, and the Ambassador of *Venice*, acting the Farce of Mediation at *Munster*, for several Years, while the War went on, till its Events regulated the Terms of Peace. The Mediation of *insignificant* Powers is therefore absurd; and the Danger of calling in a *powerful* Mediator, who may threaten to declare against you, if you do not submit to his *partial* Decisions, is too obvious to be insisted upon. You have done wisely, therefore, to keep the Negotiation in your own Hands; the Nation, from this Instance, has a full Confidence that her Interests, are skilfully conducted; and, therefore, I shall only add another Particular, which however subordinate, will, no Doubt, be attended to by you; though *some late* Negotiators of ours, with *France*, neglected it.

The *French*, by taking the Lead in *Europe* of late, have of Course, been able to introduce their Language as the common Vehicle of the Sentiments of other Nations, in all public Negotiations; so that, perhaps, the *French* is the only Tongue, by the Channel of which Plenipotentiaries and Ministers of different Countries, can converse. But when the Negotiation is to be put into Writing, and to be drawn up in that Form which is to be binding upon all the Parties, and signed jointly by the treating Powers, neither the Honour, nor the Interest of the State, ought to allow us to accept of the Original Treaty in the *Native Tongue* of our Enemies. The Honour of the Nation forbids this; as it would be a Confession of Superiority, to which  
*Britain,*

*Bri*  
*Wa*  
*mit*  
*van*  
*Cav*  
*tha*  
*Stil*  
*Har*  
*much*  
*part*  
*sal t*  
*— I*  
*Gar*  
*restr*  
*of t*  
*wher*  
*after*  
*actin*  
*been*  
*land*  
*thos*  
*oblig*  
*V*  
*Nati*  
*man*  
*have*  
*so w*  
*us, a*  
*whic*  
*to br*  
*there*

\*  
*memb*  
*were*  
*plus re*  
*de la*  
*mean*

*Britain*, at no Time, much less after so glorious a War, should submit; especially as we cannot submit to it, without giving the Enemy a real Advantage, and laying the Foundation for future Cavils.—Cardinal *Mazarine*, in his Letters, boasts, that by a latent Ambiguity and Nicety in the *French* Stile, he had been able to outwit *Don Louis de Haro*, in the Conferences at the *Pyrenees*. And a much later Instance, in which we ourselves were partly concerned, should confirm us in our Refusal to treat with the *French* in their own Language.—I mean the famous Capitulation of the *Dutch* Garrison of *Tournay* in 1745; which, though only restrained from acting for a limited Time in any of the Barrier Towns \*, as the *Dutch* believed, when they accepted of the Capitulation, was soon after interpreted by *France*, as tying them up from acting in any Part of the World; and might have been fatal to this Country, if the Rebellion in *Scotland*, to assist in quelling which the *Dutch* lent us those very Troops, had been so successful as to oblige us to put our Foreign Allies to the Test.

We have no great Reason, no more than other Nations, to trust *Gallic Faith*, as appears from the many Instances of their *unpalliated* Perfidy which I have collected above. Let us not, therefore, be so weak as to give them Room for obtruding upon us, any fallacious Interpretations of the Words, in which they plight their Faith. They are too ready to break it when the Terms are ever so clear; and, therefore, let us take Care not to give them that

\* I have not the original Capitulation before me, but I remember, pretty exactly on what the Cavil turned. The Troops were not to act, I think, for two Years, in any of the Places *les plus reculées de la Barriere*. The *Dutch*, no doubt, understood, *de la Barriere* to be the Genitive Case, but the *French* said they meant it in the Ablative.

Advantage which superior Skill in their own Language, naturally confers, and which upon some future Occasion, they may improve to our Detriment. Let the *original and authentic* Copy of the Treaty, therefore, be in a dead Language, the Phrases of which cannot vary, and whose Meaning is equally understood by both Parties. We had once a very learned Plenipotentiary in Queen *Elisabeth's* Time, who, in a Negotiation with *Spain*, when it came to be debated in what Language the Treaty should be made, ludicrously enough proposed to the *Spaniard*, who was giving himself Airs of Superiority, to treat in the Language of his Master's Kingdom of *Jerusalem*. But leaving the *Hebrew*, for our Divines; I would only have our Negotiators treat in *Latin*: Which seemed, as it were by Prescription, to have a Right to be the Language of the Public Law of *Europe*; till some late Instances have shewn that the *French* was beginning to be substituted in its Room; by the Laziness or Neglect of those who treated. As we are sanguine in our Hopes of a much better Peace than we had at *Utrecht*, with regard to the Terms; let it not be worse than that at *Utrecht*, which preserved the old Custom of settling the Negotiation in *Latin*. We then had a Bishop indeed, as Plenipotentiary; but without having Recourse to the very learned Bench, or chusing a Plenipotentiary from *Cambridge*, (I hope in a little Time one may join the other University, without giving Offence), the Negotiators at the ensuing Peace may be accommodated with *Latin* enough for the Purpose I mention, at a very moderate Expence — if their Secretary or Chaplain cannot assist them.

But when I begin to be ludicrous on so serious a Subject, it is Time to have done: And my Address has already swelled to such a Size as surprises myself

myself as much as, I fear, it will tire the Reader. However, the vast Variety of Facts, and Particulars, which naturally offered themselves to me, and which could not be admitted without hurting the Connection, and weakening my Argument, will, perhaps, procure Indulgence for so long a Pamphlet : And, for the same Reason, I flatter myself, that if I should happen to have been mistaken in any Thing I advance, to have erred in a Date, or to have mis-quoted a Treaty, some Allowances will be made to me, as I have been obliged to trust much to my Memory, for want of a proper Opportunity of consulting many of those Books, which furnish the Materials I have made Use of. However, I believe, a candid Reader, will find no *capital*, at least, no *wilful* Mistake.

I am far from the Vanity of thinking that my Notions on the important Subject of the Peace, are a regular Plan or System for the Administration to proceed upon. I throw them out, only as loose Hints for my *Superiors* to improve as they may think proper. Should there be any Weight in all, or any of them, you, *my Lord*, and *Sir*, will be able to work them into Utility for this Kingdom. If they are not worth your Notice; as I am an anonymous Writer, and hope never to be known, I can neither lose nor gain Reputation by them. All I can say, if they are neglected, is, *Operam et oleam perdidi.*

I am,

My Lord, and Sir,

Yours, &c. &c.

F I N I S.